Some rules are more difficult to write than others. Defending and attacking hills is one of them. In particular how to attack infantry which have been positioned behind the crest. This was a favourite tactic of Wellington, and proved very effective. It protected the defenders from artillery fire. It also provided a tactical shock to attacking infantry when they suddenly found them deployed and ready to fire when they finally reached the crest of the hill.
I have often wondered why this tactic was not used by many more commanders during the Napoleonic Wars. I think Blucher’s comment just before the start of the battle of Ligny may provide the answer. Wellington had joined Blucher to coordinate their strategy for the Waterloo campaign. He commented that the Prussian infantry were very exposed on the forward slope of a nearby hill. Blucher replied “my lads like to see the enemy”, or words to that effect.
I suspect what he was really saying was that he could not trust his infantry to hold their ground behind the crest as the shouts of massed infantry columns approached out of sight below the hill.
I translate this to my rules by having a morale test for infantry hidden behind the crest. When the attacking infantry come within 4” they must roll a 1D6. British require 4, 5 or 6. All other nations require 5 or 6.
I have never been completely happy with this rule. I wanted something which reflected the overall morale of the defending infantry, such as a normal morale test.
This test game used only infantry and artillery, cavalry were an unnecessary distraction. There are four infantry brigades per side. All are different combinations of class, musket and skirmish ability.
The photo shows the initial deployment. Attacking French are all in column of attack, with the artillery in the centre. Defending Russians have two brigades on the hill and two in reserve. The white card template shows the range of the Russian artillery. On a hill they are unable to angle their guns, so can only fire along this narrow corridor.
The French artillery can redeploy. They can fire on any infantry on the hill, providing that they are close enough. They roll 1D6 and require 5 or 6 at long range, the same as firing on towns or woods. The Russian gunners require 3, 4, 5 or 6
Once more we used a dice roll of 3 for all combat and morale tests. This was to see how an attack would work, without the “luck of the dice”. It is a good way to get used to the new combat and morale factors. It is also very boring.
So how did the attack go?
The Russian gunners concentrated on the brigade to the right of the French guns. They caused 20% casualties, leaving the brigade shaken, and therefore unable to initiate an attack.
The French gunners concentrated on the brigade to the right of the Russian guns. They were less successful, only managed 10% casualties and the Russian infantry passed their morale test.
It was necessary to maintain a wide gap between the two groups of French infantry to allow their artillery to continue to fire as the infantry approached the hill.
As the French infantry approached the Russian infantry on the hill deployed into line, which is more effective for firepower. The left hand reserve brigade moved forward to the left of the hill. The right hand brigade formed column of attack and moved up closer to the right hand brigade on the hill.
The right hand French brigade was an elite unit. They moved to the left of the hill and attacked the left hand Russian brigade, which was conscript. They won the melee and routed the Russian brigade.
The left hand Russian brigade on the hill was an elite grenadier brigade. They formed left and charged the French brigade. The melee between two elite brigades, with both rolling 3, was a draw. Both eventually lost 20% casualties, both were non effective.
So the battle for the hill was decided by the Russian brigade on the right. They were B class infantry (veterans). The two attacking French brigades were conscript. The Russians routed one of the French brigades, but themselves lost 20% casualties. The remaining French brigade deployed into line and routed them. The reserve Russian brigade passed their morale test as the routed infantry broke through them. They then exchanged fire with the last French brigade, who now had 20% casualties, won the firefight and routed them.
The Russians held the hill.
But had we used normal dice rolls the combat could easily have gone either way. This is exactly what I wanted to achieve. So I am very satisfied with this first test play.
Next week attacking a town or farm.
thistlebarrow -
ReplyDeleteI have a notion that the advantage of deployment behind the ridge crest had less to do with the 'ambush' aspects, than with the advantage of being downslope in a close firefight. The disadvantage of being behind the hillcrest is that the far side of the hill is dead ground. That means the enemy can get up close without having to endure incoming until they get to the hillcrest. The problem of the Prussians on forward slopes at Ligny is that the French artillery made a real mess of those poor formations, as Wellington could see.
Allowing to enemy to get up close is what sank the Army of Tennessee at Missionary Ridge in 1863. The officer in charge of laying out the trench lines placed them on the physical crest rather than the 'military' crest, which left much of the forward slope dead ground up which the Union soldiery, having carried the line at the foot of the slope, and scarcely believing their luck, surged up and over the Confederate lines. Guess who was upslope (though entrenched) when the Union soldiers broke out of the dead ground.
I can think of several actions, Napoleonic and Civil War, in which the downslope side inflicted the greater damage to their adversaries - McDowell, Groveton; Barrossa, Albuera...
My reading of Napoleonic action suggests that British skirmish lines were thick enough for the French who broke through them to think they had broken through a substantive, close-order defence line. Hence their discomfort when faced with the reserves beyond. I believe these skirmish lines were so placed as to see the entire forward slope in front of them. They would have been a fairly poor target for enemy artillery.
My attitude would be that in a hill country firefight, a slight advantage be given to the formations downslope. That cuts both ways. If the defenders are upslope, they are at a disadvantage; if the attackers are upslope, they are equally at a disadvantage. Having said that, I'd be inclined also to give the upslope people a moral(e) plus. This might seem contradictory, but it seems that was what kept the upslope side in the unequal contest. There is something morally encouraging about being upslope, possibly owing to being unaware that you're not dishing out quite the damage you think you are.
The reason for that is the tendency (I am persuaded) of even well-trained troops to fire high. With all that smoke about one can't see the enemy too well. Firing upslope might tend to mitigate that tendency; firing downslope to aggravate it.
Depending upon how your tactical rules work, I would suggest - if anything:
+1 for musketry shooting upslope OR a -1 for musketry shooting downslope (one or the other)
+1 for morale to units upslope in musketry firefight.
All this is my own conclusion from the account of several battles in which firefights developed with one side upslope of the other. I don't know that anyone else has posited any similar notion. However, it might be worth a try, just to see how it works out.
Cheers,
Ion
Hi Ion
DeleteThanks for your comments, which have given me much food for thought
From my reading of the period, all of which has been english language books, I have concluded that the advantage of being behind the crest of the hill is that you are (relatively) safe from enemy artillery fire. Your own artillery can fire at the approaching enemy, who are also disordered by the climb over broken ground. The quality and quantity of skirmish troops would make a considerable contribution. If the attackers win the skirmish fight they can force the gunners to withdraw and allow the disordered infantry to recover from the climb and prepare to attack.
All of this is based on Wellington's tactics. I can not recall reading anything about other allied nations in this period. Prussian and Austrian tactics improved greatly due to their earlier defeats by the French. So why not adopt the reverse slope tactic?
I assumed from Bluchers comments at Ligny that it was because their troops were less steady than the English. I appreciate that this is unlikely to be the sole reason. But what other reason is there?
I will give some thought to your comments.
regards
Paul